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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001607

SIPDIS

PASS TO IO/CD AND NP AND EUR/ERA

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [EUN](#) [USEU](#) [BRUSSELS](#)

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: MARCH 19 U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON  
NON-PROLIFERATION (CONOP)

REF: A. A. BRUSSELS 1119

[B. B. BRUSSELS 1081](#)

[C. C. USEU TODAY 03/03/04 AND PREVIOUS](#)

[D. D. BRUSSELS 36](#)

Classified By: USEU Poloff David Armitage for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 19, Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Geneva CD Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders and NP/PPC Director Christopher Murray led discussions on arms control and disarmament with the EU's Nonproliferation Troika (CONOP). Issues discussed were:

-- Irish European Union (EU) Presidency priorities: The Irish want to implement the EU's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation strategy. This includes seeking to universalize nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control regimes. It also includes an EU peer review of national export controls, with a general assessment planned for completion by June.

-- Nuclear Issues: The EU is concerned about planning for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Third Preparatory Committee and reiterated its call for support for extending Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership to the EU accession states that are not yet members of the NSG.

-- Missiles: The EU was raising pre-launch notifications at every occasion and has discussed it so far with 113 countries.

-- G8 Global Partnership: EU member states seemed willing to expand the Global Partnership's geographical scope, but resources would be tight through 2006.

-- Regional Issues: Iran, Libya, and North Korea were discussed, and everyone noted the need for continued US-EU cooperation.

-- Australia Group: EU restated its hope for USG assistance on extending AG membership to all EU accession states.

END SUMMARY.

EU Delegation

[1](#)2. (U) The Irish EU Presidency was represented by Disarmament and Nonproliferation Director Adrian McDaid and Deputy Director Sarah McGrath. The upcoming Dutch Presidency was represented by Nuclear Affairs and Nonproliferation Director Paul Wilke and Policy Officer Elke Merks-Schaapveld. Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative for WMD Nonproliferation and Nonproliferation Desk Officer Didier Cosse represented the Council Secretariat. Nonproliferation specialist Marc Deffrennes and USA Desk Officer Andrew Denison attended for the Commission.

Priorities of the Irish EU Presidency

[1](#)3. (SBU) McDaid said that a priority for the Irish Presidency would be to implement the EU's WMD nonproliferation strategy (ref. D). A key tool in the EU strategy is to seek universalization of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control regimes. This will be in the form of a series of demarches to countries that have not yet acceded to the regimes. The first round, currently underway, urges universal membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The results will be compiled in a matrix and delivered to the organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The EU is working on the terms of reference for a Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) demarche. The EU also plans to hold a seminar on challenge inspections, as part of its effort to strengthen multilateral nonproliferation regimes. McDaid discussed plans to exchange information among EU member states on bilateral assistance to prevent overlap.

[1](#)4. (C) Giannella described the EU nonproliferation strategy. In early February, a team of EU member state experts began a peer review of national export controls and hoped to have a general assessment completed by June. The EU is also implementing a Council Directive on controlling radioactive

sources that is stronger than a Code of Conduct, and recently conducted a demarche campaign urging countries to enhance the physical protection of fissile materials. Moreover, the Political-Security Committee (PSC) plans to discuss transshipment/transit and seizure issues, which Giannella described as "conceptually linked" to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), but which she said "needs to happen anyway." (ref. C)

15. (U) McDaid and Murray exchanged views on US and EU efforts to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities. McDaid noted that the EU had just pledged 3.3 million euros through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget to fund three new EU-selected, IAEA-implemented programs in Southeast Europe and the Caucasus/Central Asia. Murray responded that the US provides about USD 50 million annually in voluntary contributions to the IAEA. Murray also provided an update on the status of ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol in the Senate. McDaid emphasized that the EU was looking to work with the US to strengthen the IAEA. With reference to the President's February 11 nonproliferation speech, he asked rhetorically how we might define "under suspicion" when deciding whether to bar a country from the IAEA Board of Governors.

#### Nuclear Issues/NPT

16. (C) Ambassador Sanders stressed that the U.S. was committed to a renewed emphasis on compliance with NPT nonproliferation obligations. Recent disclosures in Libya and elsewhere have made clear that the NPT needs strengthening, a goal the US would pursue at the 2004 NPT Prepcom and 2005 Review Conference (RevCon). McDaid discussed issues related to the run-up to the Third PrepCom. He noted that the PrepCom should provide two sets of recommendations: one procedural and the other substantive. McDaid agreed that it would be best if PrepCom III could resolve the RevCon agenda issues, and cautioned that we should avoid publicly discussing any possibility of a 4th PrepCom to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy.

17. (C) On the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Dutch Nuclear Affairs and Nonproliferation division head Wilke described work in several areas: a French paper on sensitive technologies; a French/British/Swedish paper on information exchange; a British/Austrian paper on the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; and a French outreach paper. Sweden had raised the issue of NSG intelligence sharing, and was hoping to get into greater depth at information sharing meetings by limiting participation to a select group. The EU reiterated its call for support on ensuring NSG membership for all ten EU accession states. Murray later reported that the U.S. supports NSG membership for Malta, Estonia, and Latvia, the three accession states that are not already members of the NSG. Finally, the EU expressed concern over China's bid for NSG membership, particularly with regard to 1993 grandfathering and IAEA safeguards. Murray reviewed the President's speech of February 11 as it described proposals for limiting the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology. These proposals, he continued, could be effected through strengthening NSG guidelines, which would be discussed at the upcoming NSG working level meeting in Vienna. Wilke replied that most EU member states would support our amendments, but that one (note: one EU participant confirmed on the margins that it was France. end note) was likely to block full EU consensus.

18. (C) European Commission nonproliferation specialist Defrennes raised a question about how to deal with spent fuel. He said some were concerned about the possible impact of the US NSG proposals on the EU's internal market and Euratom. He added that the Commission legal services were responding to a member state request for further analysis.

#### Missiles

19. (C) Wilke asked where the US stood with Russia on finalizing the pre-launch notification system, and urged us to move quickly to finish the process. He said that the EU was raising pre-launch notifications at every occasion. The EU has discussed it with 113 countries so far. On the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wilke noted that Kazakhstan's and Croatia's MTCR membership credentials were weak, but stressed the EU desire that no one break silence on EU accession state applications. Murray agreed that Croatia and Kazakhstan were not potential significant suppliers of missile technology, and Kazakhstan was not part of the ICOC or BWC. Wilke expressed interest in whether interception would be on the agenda of the Re-enforced Point of Contact meeting in Paris 13-14 April, and if so, whether it would be related to PSI.

#### G-8 Global Partnership

10. (C) Deffrennes provided a readout of ongoing Commission efforts in the G-8 Global Partnership (GP), and said the EU's

Joint Action to renew the program with Russia would be finalized June 24. Deffrennes noted also that the EU was unhappy with Russia's efforts to link GP assistance delays to Russia's failure to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles in accordance with its CWC commitments. He said there appeared to be the will among EU member states to expand the geographical scope of the GP and to devise a second Joint Action program. He warned, however, that the EC would be under budget constraints through 2006, so new money would not be available until the 2007-2013 budget cycle. Murray replied that the US is focusing on the threat, not just geography, and is also considering countries such as Libya, Iraq, etc.

#### Regional Issues

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11. (C) On Iran, the EU was supportive of the efforts by the EU-3 and recognizes the need to maintain pressure. McDaid assessed Iranian cooperation so far as mixed -- should have been better but could have been worse -- and said the EU was pleased that the IAEA Board of Governors was able to agree on a resolution by consensus. On Libya, McDaid said the EU was pleased with the BOG resolution and with the US-UK disarmament efforts.

12. (C) Wilke was interested in US views on the situation in the DPRK, particularly as it impacts KEDO. Currently, there is no EU position on the costs of suspending KEDO, but he emphasized that there was a connection between KEDO suspension and Six Party talks. Wilke reiterated what he called the "standing offer" made by EU Asia Directors and DG Cooper (refs. A and B) to assist in any way possible with the Six Party process. Giannella said the EU did not want the DPRK to have even a civilian nuclear facility, though it was unclear how North Korea would meet its energy needs without one.

#### Australia Group

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13. (C) Wilke was open to US ideas on preparation for the AG plenary June 7-10 in Paris. He reiterated the need to discuss membership in the AG for the ten EU accession states. Murray said the US was discussing the issue with EU counterparts through AG channels, and would do so more once the current MTCR silence process was finished. He said the US would appreciate EU assistance in persuading Switzerland and France to stop blocking the addition of new nerve gas precursors to the control lists. The EU took note of the request but did not respond.

Schnabel